What is wrong with the cogito?

What is wrong with the cogito?

Descartes has, in his meditation, elaborated the idea of the evil genius deceiving him of all things that he might conceive as being real, making him perplexed as to what must be real, what must be not? He further arrives at the notion that if he is being deceived and all his thoughts might be illusions, then he himself must exist, as it is being deceived. His existence is essential to his deception, and that is true of any mind that can utter its thoughts, so a thinking mind.

Descartes, of course, quite clearly believed that he and his “self” is responsible for his thoughts and process of thinking, which led to his conclusion that he, as a thinking entity, must exist.

Here in this short essay, I would like to attend to what is missing in this notion put forth by Descartes, and for that, I will take inspiration from Bertrand Russell’s work in his description of what is wrong with the cogito. However, it is worth mentioning that I have not read Bertrand Russell’s work and his argument but just the principle on which he builds his argument, namely the questionable assumption of treating the self as a constant in time and responsible for thinking thoughts.

In his attempt to declare himself and his mind “real” and in existence, Descartes makes an implicit assumption. He comes to think that self is a constant. That there is such a self that is unchanging from moment to moment. That is, in turn, responsible for all his thoughts. This assumption is not quite axiomatic as Descartes deems it to be. It is not so clear that I am today the same as I was yesterday and will be tomorrow, responsible for the same or similar thoughts. All observable evidence attests to the contrary. Although a degree of consistency is held in mind as a continuous self, especially for a short period, the idea of a constant, true self becomes increasingly troubling if we compare one’s “self” at five years of age with her self at 25 or 85.

And not just physical change, which might be of less interest, especially to Descartes, but mental and cognitive change. Further, it is unclear whether this consistent self held in mind exists or is simply an illusion.

If we do not take the physical body of an individual and their mental and cognitive faculty to be their self (and why should we?), then what is the “self” that is thinking, therefore is real? It becomes increasingly difficult to find a place for such a self, especially if this self is responsible for the thinking which makes it exist.

Without going in-depth into Descartes’s notion of self, he takes the self to be none physical, ergo perhaps not susceptible to change. From all we know from modern neuroscience, thinking is a process or a collection of functions in the brain, which is quite physical, and a self need not be a pre-requisite for it. Therefore, Descartes’s argument lands at I think consequently, my brain exists. I do not quarrel with that argument. But indeed, the brain does undergo change and not so constant and need not be equated to self, at least not axiomatically. From what we know from the laws of Physics in our universe, all physical things change. So, to arrive at a constant self that Descartes calls “I,” such a self cannot be material and certainly not required to be real. Of course, Descartes does not believe such a self physical; however, its existence from Descartes’s cogito argument is very much in question given the thinking is done by a physical object called the brain.

Cogito then does not necessarily infer the existence of a being from the process of thinking. Instead, what it does achieve is infer the existence of a thinking object. Whether the thinking object is a being is a self or Descartes himself is up for a separate discussion that cannot be lumped into the cogito principle itself.

I intend not to dismiss cogito and Descartes’s thought experiment altogether. Instead, to point out the premature jump from the existence of a thinking thing to himself or a being or the self, existing and being real. That jump is not entirely clear and requires further discussion. In fact, Descartes thought experiment is quite insightful. His notion that if something is being deceived or undergoing a process called thinking, its existence must be axiomatic is compelling. Now let us address whether this thinking thing implies the self that can exist in a separate argument.

The whole enterprise that Descartes had taken up was to address what is, in fact, real and what is perhaps an illusion. Whether the self is one such reality in existence or an illusion was not quite addressed comprehensively in cogito; we have discussed and pointed out one major issue in the argument. Of course, many philosophers have attempted to address that very question, from Descartes himself to John Lock, who held similar views to Descartes and David Hume and Immanuel Kant, who were less in line with Descartes. David Hume, for instance, championed the no-self argument. He believed that the self is more of a perception. This would put the self in the space of things that can be tampered with by the deceptive work of an all powerful being making Descartes think the thoughts he thinks, which puts the existence of such self in doubt.

Of course, the intention of this essay is not to debate the existence and place of the self or lack thereof. But instead, to point out the problem in cogito as a principle in its assumption that self must be a constant directly linked to thinking which there is no direct comprehensive evidence for, whether scientific or otherwise. That requires further thought, contemplation, and meditation to arrive at or reject.

References:

1. DESCARTES, RENE. MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

2. Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. Routledge, 2015.

3. Haut, Voler. “12 Philosophers of the ‘Self.’” Voler Haut Ian, 31 Aug. 2018, https://volerhautian.wordpress.com/2018/08/31/12-philosophers-of-the-self/.